REPORT

of

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 29, 1851.

Sir: I beg leave to submit the following report of the operations of this Department during the year which has just expired.

The subject which has most engaged the attention of the Department, has been the defence of Texas, New Mexico, and the Mexican territory adjacent to our own, against the incursions of the neighboring Indian tribes.

In my last annual report, I briefly adverted to the nature of these incursions. Unlike their race in this part of the continent, these tribes are animated, not so much by hostility to the whites as by motives of plunder. Accustomed, from time immemorial, to carry on a predatory warfare against the Spanish settlements in their vicinity, they submit with reluctance to the efforts of a new and more powerful race to put a stop to their incursions. The character of the country, which affords wonderful facilities to escape, and presents almost insurmountable barriers to pursuit, is wonderfully adapted to these marauding expeditions. As infantry is of little use in a service which consists principally in pursuing small parties, whose are always mounted, I recommended in my last report the raising of an additional mounted regiment, equipped with special reference to this service. Congress not having adopted this recommendation, all that remained for the Department to do was to make such a disposition of the force at its disposal as would most effectually protect our own territory, and fulfil our treaty obligations to Mexico. Accordingly prompt measures were taken to concentrate, on the confines of Texas and New Mexico, as many of the troops adapted to this service as could be spared from other quarters.

The Indians in California and Oregon having always appeared of an unfriendly character, and disposed to cultivate the good will of the whites, it was thought that the services of the regiment of mounted riflemen might be dispensed with on the Pacific. It was therefore ordered to Texas. Brevet Major-General Smith, its commander, was put in command of the eighth military department, and Brevet Brigadier-General Hitchcock was ordered to succeed him in the command of the Pacific Division.

In the interval of several months which elapsed between the death of Brevet Major-General Brooke and the arrival of Brevet Major-General Smith in Texas, the command of that department devolved on Brevet Brigadier-General Harney—during which time this officer displayed his accustomed activity in arresting the incursions of the Indians, and the good effect of the measures adopted by him are already discernible in the comparative tranquility which that section of the country has, for some time past, enjoyed.

Some of the fiercest and most insolent of the tribes in all that region occupy the northern portion of Texas, where the streams that flow into the Mississippi, as well as those that empty themselves directly into the Gulf,
find their sources. From this region these tribes make frequent forays, not only into Texas and New Mexico, but across the Rio Grande into the Mexican territory, with the double object of overwring these tribes, and of affording protection to such emigrants as may take that route to Texas, New Mexico or California. I deemed it advisable to establish a chain of military posts on that frontier. For this purpose, the fifth regiment of infantry, which was already stationed high up the Red river and the Arkansas, was ordered to advance farther into the interior and to establish a chain of posts extending in a western direction and following, as nearly as practicable, the route called (from the name of the officer who traced it) "Marcy's route."

The seventh regiment of infantry was ordered from Jefferson barracks to occupy the stations abandoned by the fifth.

In New Mexico, the Indians had become so bold as to commit their depredations within a few miles of the military posts, and I regret to say that in no instance was their authority chastised. To remedy, if possible, this state of things, Brevet Colonel Sanger was ordered to the command of that department.

He arrived at Santa Fe in the month of July last, and his first step was to make a new and, it is believed, a more judicious arrangement of the military posts. His next was to set out with a portion of his command on an expedition into the country of the Navajos, a powerful tribe which has long spread terror, not only in Texas and New Mexico, but even in the State of Sonora. The result of this expedition is not yet known, but if he should accomplish no more than to establish a military post among them and retaliate upon them by capturing their herds and destroying their fields, the expedition will not have been Fruitless.

Experience has shown that the most effectual way to protect our settlements is to subdue the Indians by a constant display of military force in their immediate neighborhood; for this reason, as well as on account of the demoralizing influence of the towns and villages on the troops, the commanding officers, both in Texas and New Mexico, were directed to remove the stations as near the frontiers as circumstances would permit. Both these officers have, with their accustomed promptitude, taken steps to carry this measure into effect, and made an entirely new arrangement of posts, looking, as far as practicable, alike to the defence of our own territory and that of Mexico. Strong hopes are entertained that, when their plans shall have been fully developed, the Indians will be disposed to make treaties and to observe them.

The United States have thus endeavored to fulfill, to their fullest extent, the obligations imposed upon them by their late treaty with Mexico. It surely was never contemplated that the entire expense and responsibility of defending her territory against these incursions should devolve upon us. The language of the treaty admits of no such construction, and if it did, it would require of us what it would be obviously impossible for us to perform. As the United States have no right to station their troops within the limits of Mexico, how is it possible for them entirely to protect her against tribes, most of whom occupy the vast desert lying between the two countries? All that we can do is to make common cause with her; to make her wrongs our own; to chastise, if possible, the tribes by whom they are committed; to compel them, whenever it is possible to do so, to make restitution of Mexican prisoners and property; and, finally, in our treaties with them, to guard the interests of Mexican citizens as carefully
as those of our own, and to punish any violation of the one as severely as we do that of the other. It is manifest, too, that whatever efforts we may make for the protection of Mexico, will not only be fruitless but absolutely prejudicial, unless they are aided by corresponding efforts on her part. The number of our military posts, the vigilance, activity and courage of our troops, all tend to drive these marauders from our border towards that of Mexico, where they can carry on their depredations with almost certain impunity.

The difference in the character of the inhabitants of the two countries also tends to the same result. Our people are all familiar with the use of arms, and readily form themselves into militia companies for their own defense. It was this circumstance, joined with a native hardiness of character, that enabled the pioneers of all our States to subdue tribes far more formidable than the robber bands that infest the frontiers of Mexico. The inhabitants of Mexico, on the contrary, have little skill in firearms—nothing that deserves the name of a militia, and little of that daring intrepidity which distinguished the early settlers of our own country. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Indians stand less in awe of the Mexicans than they do of our people, and that, where both countries present equal temptations to plunder, they should direct their incursions towards the former rather than the latter.

It is not improbable, also, that the feebleness of the federal authority in Mexico, the distracted state of that republic, and the civil contests that have so long divided her people, may impair her influence among savages who know no right but power, and no motive but the fear of its exercise.

The portion of Mexico which is said to have suffered more from these depredations is the State of Sonora. Between that State and the inhabited portions of Texas and New Mexico, there is an extensive range of mountain and desert for the most part uninhabitable, and, at certain seasons of the year, almost impassable. To send, therefore, to that frontier a sufficient force to afford it any effectual protection, and to maintain it there, would be attended with difficulties almost insuperable. A post, however, has been established at the junction of the Gila and the Colorado, and the commander of the Pacific division has been directed to examine whether it would not be practicable and expedient to establish one or more posts higher up the Gila. His report on that subject has not yet yet been received. It has been fully ascertained, however, that to maintain even an inconceivable force in that region would be attended with an enormous expense.

These depredations in Sonora are committed chiefly by the Apaches and the Navajos—the same tribes that are the most troublesome in Texas and New Mexico. The troops employed in the defense of our own settlements are, therefore, indirectly aiding in the defense of Sonora; for if we can succeed in compelling these tribes to make treaties and to fulfill them, the measure will be as conducive to the protection of the Mexican territory as of our own.

It must not, however, be supposed that the Indians that infest the Mexican settlements all reside within our limits. It is difficult to assign any definite boundaries to wandering tribes who subsist almost entirely by the chase, or on herds of cattle which they drive before them in their migrations, but it is well known that some of these have their habitual haunts within the limits of Mexico.

There are strong reasons, too, to believe that the vagabond runners that
have reached this country of ravages committed by Indians in the Mexican states have been grossly exaggerated, and sometimes entirely fabricated. An idea seems to have gone abroad among the people of that country, that this Government was bound, by its treaty with Mexico, to indemnify citizens of that country who might sustain losses by depredations of the Indians, and from information that has reached the Department there can be no doubt that, in some instances, tales of depredations have been invented with a view of bringing fictitious claims for damages against the Government.

The Indians west of the Rocky Mountains, are represented to be less warlike in character than those on the eastern side of the continent, and, until recently, had manifested no unfriendly feelings towards the white settlers in their neighborhood. Several outbusts however have, within a few months past, occurred both in California and Oregon. There is reason to believe that, in some instances, the Indians have been goaded on to these acts of hostility by the conduct of their own people. Treaties have recently been made with one of these tribes, which, if they are faithfully observed on our part, and if the white inhabitants are compelled to respect the boundaries of the territory assigned to them, will go far towards reconciling this unfortunate race to their fate, and preventing future outbreaks. I recommend, therefore, that the laws restricting intercourse with the Indians and encroachments on their lands be rigidly enforced, and, if necessary, more stringent enactments be passed for that purpose.

It would not be safe, however, to rely on any pacific policy, however wise and just, for the protection of our fellow-citizens in that remote region. Since the withdrawal of the regiment of mounted ridedmen, the military force on the Pacific is extremely small. By the returns of the Adjutant-General, appended to the report of the General-in-chief, it appears that the entire force stationed on the Pacific amounted at the last return, to only seven hundred and thirty-six (736) men. This force is deemed entirely inadequate for the protection of the inhabitants — particularly of Oregon. The Governor of that Territory has represented this fact, and has urged an increase of the force stationed within it. The means now at the disposal of the Department do not enable it to comply with this demand.

In my last annual report I recommended the creation of a new regiment of mounted men. The withdrawal of the regiment of mounted ridedmen from the Pacific has, to some extent, diminished the necessity of creating an additional regiment of that description. That, however, is not peculiarly adapted to cavalry, and its place may well be supplied by infantry. Nevertheless, by the report of the General-in-chief, it will be seen that he considers not only this additional regiment of cavalry, but also an increase in the rank and file of the infantry and artillery as indispensably necessary. While I feel some hesitation in urging upon Congress any addition to the force on the frontier, where the support of troops is attended with such enormous expense, I cannot but acknowledge the force of his remarks and the weight that is due to his recommendation. I hope, therefore, that the matter will be submitted to Congress.

The entire number of men borne on the rolls amounts to ten thousand five hundred and thirty-eight (10,338) which, according to the usual estimate, will furnish an effective force of not more than eight thousand five hundred (8,500) men. When it is considered that this small force is scattered over a frontier of several thousands of miles in extent, its insufficiency will be apparent,
In my last annual report, I adverted to the enormous increase in the expense of supporting the army, and to the causes that produced it. These causes are principally,

1st. That, as has been already stated, more than one-half of the whole army are stationed on our remote frontier, and so far as expenses are concerned, may be considered as in active service in time of war.

2d. That the military posts on the frontier were formerly on or near navigable rivers, but now, on the contrary, are either far from the interior of the country or on the Pacific, and, consequently, can only be reached by an overland journey of hundreds of miles, or by a sea voyage of several thousand.

The following is a list of what were our most remote posts in 1845, and their respective distances from navigation.

Fort Snelling, accessible by steamboats.
Fort Leavenworth, accessible by steamboats.
Fort Wilkins, accessible by steamboats.
Fort Gibson, accessible by steamboats.
Fort Smith, accessible by steamboats.
Fort Jessup, 24 miles from steamboat navigation by wagons.
Fort Atkinson, 24 miles from steamboat navigation, by wagons.
Fort Towson, six miles from steamboat navigation, by wagons.
Fort Washita, 86 miles from steamboat navigation, by wagons.
Fort Scott, ninety miles from steamboat navigation, by wagons.

Compare this list with that of some of the most remote posts at the present time.

Indianola, now the depot for the greater part of the posts in Texas, and some of these in New Mexico, is five hundred and forty miles by water, from New Orleans: from this depot it is, by wagons,

To Fort Worth, - - - - - - 420 miles.
To El Paso, - - - - - - 863 "
To Dona Anna, - - - - - - 839 "
To the post at the copper mines, - - - - - - 979 "

Fort Towson and Fort Smith, both depending upon New Orleans, are the frontier depots for the posts on the north line of Texas: the transportation by wagons is, from Fort Towson to Fort Belknap, 302 miles; from Fort Smith to Fort Arbuckle, 167 miles.

Fort Leavenworth, four hundred and twenty miles from St. Louis, by water, is the frontier depot for the posts on the Santa Fé and Oregon routes. Thence it is, by wagons,

To Fort Laramie, - - - - - - 637 miles.
To Fort Union, - - - - - - 758 "
To Santa Fé, - - - - - - 821 "
To Socorro, - - - - - - 981 "
To San Juan, - - - - - - 1438 "

From St. Louis to Fort Snelling, by water, is 725 miles, and thence to Fort Ripley, by wagons, 125 miles.
From St. Louis to Keskuk, by water, 179 miles, and thence to Fort Dodge, by wagons, 280 miles.

A large portion of the supplies for the posts on the Pacific are drawn from the Atlantic States.

3d. The frontier posts, as may be seen by the foregoing list, were then
situated in the midst of a fertile and productive country, where nearly all the supplies for the troops could be procured. Now, on the contrary, they are, for the most part, in one of the most unproductive regions in the world, which furnishes but a small portion of the necessary supplies for an army. These supplies must, therefore, all be drawn from the older States and transported immense distances. The consequence is that, while in 1845 the cost of transportation (of troops and supplies) was $130,053.52, in 1850-1851 it amounted to $22,091,108.51. In the former the cost of forage was $839,791.29, in the latter it was $1,287,327.91. The great increase in this last item arises not only from the causes just mentioned, but also from the great increase of animals in the Quartermaster’s department, which in 1845 amounted only to $17, and in 1850-51 to upwards of $8000; and also to the fact that the mounted force has been greatly increased.

4th. The great distance which troops have now to be transported in going to and from the several posts.

This is a very important item. Owing to the smallness of our army, changes of station are very frequent, and instead of being made, as they formerly were, by water, they are now made by land. When it is recollected what a vast amount of transportation is necessary for an army on a long march, when not only their baggage, but supplies of every kind (including provisions for their daily consumption) must be carried with them, some idea may be formed of the expense attending these changes of station. The above facts will serve, in some degree, to explain the great increase that has taken place in the expenditures of that Department. For fuller explanations on this subject, I refer to the accompanying report of the quartermaster-general.

It is probable, however, that in some instances, the expenditures, both of the quartermaster’s and the commissary departments may have been increased by mal-administration. The transactions of both these departments involve such a variety of details, and their agents are so far removed from the supervision of their chiefs, that abuses may exist a long time before they are discovered. Every effort, however, has been used to detect these abuses, and to prevent their recurrence. Inspectors have been sent to the frontiers to inquire into the manner in which the affairs of these departments are administered, and a rigid scrutiny into accounts has been ordered. I regret to say that the department has some reasons to fear that its apprehensions on this subject were not altogether without foundation.

From statements carefully prepared by the different bureaus of this department, it appears that the increased expenditures in the army, resulting from our newly-acquired territory, (including Texas) amounted to $1,546,709.75.

Congress, at their last session, omitted to provide for a deficiency which was ascertained to exist in the appropriations for the quartermaster’s department for the year ending 30th June last. Serious embarrassment would have resulted to the service from this omission, had there not existed some unexpended balances of former appropriations, which, under the act of August 26, 1852, were transferred to the quartermaster’s department. Congress also reduced all the items of appropriations but one, for the same department, for the current fiscal year ending 30th June next, fifty per cent., below the estimate; the consequence of which is, that the appropriations for that department are entirely inadequate to its wants, and that Congress will be called upon, at an early period, to supply the deficiency.
Congress having clearly manifested a determination to reduce, as far as possible, the expenditures of the army, I felt it my duty, as far as was practicable, to carry their views into effect. I have accordingly labored to reform abuses, to enforce rigidly all regulations looking to economy, and to retrench every unnecessary expense. I will enumerate some of the measures adopted for this purpose:

The number of enlisted men in the ordnance department prior to the late war, amounted to two hundred and fifty (250) men, but during the war it was increased to five hundred and eighty-seven (587) men. By an order of the department they were reduced to their original number.

Prior to the late war there were only four light artillery companies; after the war broke out, four more of the artillery companies were converted into light artillery, making, in all, eight companies. This description of troops, although extremely effective in a regular war, are utterly useless in the kind of service in which the army is now employed. The department did not hesitate, therefore, to direct that six of these companies should be dismounted. Of this number, four will continue dismounted, unless Congress should otherwise direct; but as it is deemed important to preserve a portion of this description of force, the two remaining companies will be remounted as soon as the department is provided with the means of doing so. This will make, in all, four companies, or one to each of the regiments of artillery, which seems to have been contemplated by the act of 1827.

A number of persons from civil life are employed in the service in various capacities, such as clerks, &c. An order was issued whereby their number has been greatly reduced, and their duties required to be performed by officers and soldiers.

An order was issued last spring, that at all the permanent posts on the frontier, where it was practicable, farming should be established, to be cultivated by the troops. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to ascertain the result of the experiment. If it should prove successful, it will not only effect a considerable reduction of expenses in the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, but will greatly promote the health and comfort of the troops.

Besides these measures, various others, which it is needless to enumerate, have been adopted with a view to promote economy, and to insure fidelity and attention on the part of disbursing officers.

The fact is not to be disguised, that a great laxity of expense, and a disregard of the regulations looking to economy, had become somewhat prevalent in the army. The department has exerted itself to remedy this evil, and is gratified to say, that in all its efforts for this purpose it has received the aid and zealous cooperation of the superior officers. The effect of the measures it has adopted for this purpose is already discernible, in a considerable reduction of the expenditures; and I have the satisfaction to announce that the estimates of the department, for the next fiscal year, are considerably below the expenditures of the present and preceding years.

The expenditures for the support of the army, for the fiscal year ending 30th June last, were $9,060,208 58
The estimates for the next year are $7,898,775 83

Showing a reduction of $1,161,432 75
There are some other measures of economy which the department would have carried out, had the aid of legislation not been necessary to enable it to do so. A number of arsenals have from time to time been established at points where they were then needed, but where, in consequence of the extension of our frontier and the vastly increased facilities of transportation, they are now entirely useless. As it is doubtful whether it be competent for the executive to abolish these establishments, it is desirable that this authority be vested in it by law.

In my last report I recommended that the department should be authorized to enlist men specially as teamsters, and stated, at length, my reasons for this recommendation. Further experience confirms me in the opinion that this mode of obtaining the aid of this indispensable class of persons (of whom five or six hundred are constantly employed by the quartermaster's department) is far preferable to the plan now resorted to, of employing them sometimes at exorbitant wages. It has been suggested, however, that instead of enlisting men specially as teamsters, it would be better to increase the number of privates in each company on the frontier to one hundred, and to authorize the allowance of a higher rate of pay to such of them as should be detailed as teamsters. This arrangement would enable the officer in command to use them either as teamsters or as soldiers as circumstances might require.

The removal of the obstructions to the navigation of Red river and of the Rio Grande, would greatly reduce the expense of supplying many of the posts in Texas and New Mexico, by diminishing the amount of land transportation. I have little doubt that the amount that the government would save by means of this improvement in two or three years would defray the cost of the work.

But whatever efforts may be made, either by Congress or by the department, to curtail the expenses of the army, they must continue to be enormous so long as it is necessary that so large a portion of it should be stationed on the frontier. The history of the world affords no instance of an army being permanently stationed at so great a distance from the main source of its supplies. It is evident, therefore, that Congress should resort to every means to diminish the necessity of regular troops for the defence of the frontier. Permit me to offer a few suggestions on this point, though they do not immediately relate to the operations of this department.

In the first place, I would suggest that every facility and encouragement should be afforded to the formation of a local militia, in which our new possessions, like all the Mexican States, are very deficient. As the first step towards the accomplishment of this object, I would recommend that the executive be authorized to distribute arms among the inhabitants. I am fully persuaded that the advantages that would result from the adoption of this measure, in familiarizing the people with the use of arms, in inspiring them with confidence, and in encouraging the formation of militia companies, would more than compensate for the trifling expense that would attend it. The very fact that the inhabitants were known to be armed would tend to intimidate the Indians. The distribution should, of course, be made with such precautions as would prevent their being sold or converted to an improper use.

The quantity of arms to which the new States and Territories are respectively entitled under the act of 1808, is so small as to be of no practical
advantage, and as they have not participated in the issues heretofore made, it would seem to be but just that they should now receive more than their distributive share. At all events they might be permitted to receive their quota for several years in advance. As the arms are lying idle in the depots, no loss to the government would result from this course, and they will, probably, be never more needed than they are at present.

In the next place, policy and humanity both require that we should employ some other means of putting a stop to these depredations than the terror of our arms; we should try the effect of conciliatory measures. There is no doubt that the Indians are frequently impelled to commit depredations by despair and hunger. As the white population has advanced upon them, they have been compelled to recede before it. The lands that afford nourishment to cattle and game are also the best adapted to cultivation, and consequently the first to tempt the settler, so that the Indians are compelled to take refuge in arid plains and mountains that afford little sustenance to animal life, and even there the circle of white population seems rapidly closing around them. This is particularly the case in Texas. The United States, as the owners of the public domain, have always acted on the principle that the aboriginal race had, at least, a right of occupancy in the soil, and when it was needed for settlement, this right has been extinguished by voluntary sale. Texas, on the contrary, as the owner of all the vacant land within her limits, acknowledges it is said, no such right, and she has from time to time taken possession of the territory occupied by the Indians—laid it off into counties, and proceeded to survey and sell it. Nothing could be more calculated to alarm and exasperate the Indians and to bring about collisions between them and the white settlers, than the adoption of this policy. That such has been and must continue to be its consequence, there can be no doubt. It would seem, therefore, to be for the advantage both of Texas herself, and of the United States, that these Indians should be left in undisturbed possession of a small portion of her vast territory.

I would also recommend that measures be taken to furnish, for a series of years, food and other necessaries to such Indians as will abandon their predatory habits and cultivate the soil. Authentic information, recently received at this Department, leads to the belief that these tribes are far less numerous than they are generally supposed to be, and I have no doubt (laying aside considerations of humanity) that it would be far less expensive to feed them than to fight them.

During the last summer, the Florida Indians voluntarily surrendered to the agent stationed among them, three of their people who had murdered the youth mentioned in my last report. The Secretary of the Interior, considering this act as an evidence of their desire to remain at peace with the whites, suggested that there was no longer any reason for their continuing under the charge of this Department; and upon his demand, they were placed in the charge of the Department over which he presides.

I took occasion, during the last summer, to visit the Military Academy, and am enabled, from personal observation, to bear testimony to the admirable method of instruction pursued, and the excellent discipline that prevails at this most useful institution. A building, in which lessons in horsemanship could be given, when the weather will not admit of this exercise in the open air, would greatly conduce both to the health and the improvement of the cadets.

I also visited the National Armories at Springfield and Harper's Ferry,
and I cannot speak in terms of too high praise of the order and regularity that prevail at those establishments, and of the admirable economy with which they are conducted.

The operations of the Bureau of Topographical Engineers have been various and important during the last year.

The survey of the northern lakes, a work of which the importance can hardly be estimated, has been prosecuted with great activity, and it would have advanced still more rapidly had the appropriations for that object admitted it. With a view to hasten the completion of the work, the estimates for it for the next year have been increased.

The survey of the creek boundary from the frontiers of Arkansas to nearly the one hundredth degree of longitude west, and that of a route for a road from St. Louis to the great bend of Red river, have been completed and are ready to be laid before Congress.

The expedition to the Salt lake of the territory of Utah has also returned. The report which, by a resolution of the Senate at the last session, was ordered to be printed, will be ready for delivery during the approaching session.

The expedition under Brevet Captain Sitgreaves, mentioned in my last annual report, from Santa Fe to the head waters of the Zuni, and down that river to its mouth, is still in the field.

The survey of the delta of the Mississippi, with a view to the prevention of overflows, for which an appropriation was made the session preceding the last, has been nearly completed. One of the gentlemen charged with this highly important work has made his report. That of the other has been delayed by his illness, but it is in course of preparation, and as soon as it is received, both reports will be laid before you.

In consequence of the numerous demands made on the corps of Topographical Engineers, not only for the duties that properly devolve on it, but to meet the demands of other departments under whose charge surveys are made, the head of that corps strongly urges that the number of the officers of that corps be increased. The remarks on this subject, contained in his report, which is here appended, are entitled to, and I hope will receive your attention.

I beg leave, also, to call your attention to the laws organizing the Subsistence Department. It was the intention of Congress that this branch of the staff should consist of a fixed number of officers, who should be regularly appointed by the President, and should give bonds before entering upon the discharge of their duties. This plan, however, has never been fully carried into effect. The number of assistant commissaries was limited by the act of 1821 to fifty, but this number being found insufficient, several laws, subsequently passed, were so construed as to dispense with the limitation, and occasionally triple that number have been in service. Notwithstanding this great increase, it not unfrequently happens that, by changes in the distribution of the troops, a post or detachment is left without any assistant commissary, in which case it is the practice for the commanding officer to designate some subaltern officer as acting Assistant Commissary.

As the posts where these officers are stationed are frequently very remote, it often happens that the assistant and acting assistant commissaries are in the actual discharge of their duties, and entrusted with money and property for a long time before they can receive regular appointments and furnish
bonds. The consequences of this mode of conducting the business of the subsistence department are, that its highly important duties must often devolve on young and very inexperienced officers, that large sums of money and property of great value frequently pass into the hands of officers who have furnished no bonds, and finally great confusion in accounts, and consequent embarrassment and delay in their settlement. I know no other mode of remedying these evils than by appointing a few additional commissaries so as to enable the department to send several to the different military departments on the frontier, and to assign to each one the charge of a certain number of posts. Some of the assistant commissaries could thus be dispensed with, and the accounts and transactions of the remainder placed under more immediate and strict supervision. This plan would not be more expensive than that now pursued, and would afford better guarantees for the faithful and efficient discharge of the duties of these officers.

The Board to whom the management of the military asylum for disabled and destitute soldiers, established at the last session of Congress, was committed, have devoted a great deal of time and attention to the selection of suitable sites. They have determined on one in the vicinity of this city, the terms of the purchase have been agreed on, and as soon as the titles shall have been examined and approved, the agreement will be carried into effect.

I beg leave, again, to suggest the expediency of creating a retired list of disabled officers. Further observation has confirmed me in the opinion that this measure would conduces both to the efficiency and the economy of the service.

By the act of 28th September, 1850, making appropriations for the support of the army, a small additional pay was allowed to the officers and soldiers stationed in California and Oregon. That provision expires by its own limitation on the 1st March next. The reasons for its adoption still exist, and I recommend that it be continued in force, and that it include also New Mexico, where these reasons apply with at least equal force.

The act of 1808, providing for arming and equipping the whole body of the militia, directs that the distribution of arms provided for by that act among the States and territories, should be based upon the number of their "effective militia." As the act specifies no mode in which this number shall be ascertained, each State and territory adopts a method of its own. The consequence is, that some States make very imperfect returns, and some no returns at all, whereby the law is rendered unequal in its operation. This inequality might be prevented and some unnecessary trouble and expense saved, by simply declaring that the number of free white male inhabitants over the age of —— years and under that of —— years in the respective States and territories, as shown by the latest census, shall hereafter be the basis of distribution.

Respectfully submitted,

C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War.

To the President.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

I.—Papers respecting military and Indian affairs in Texas.

1. Instructions to General P. F. Smith.

II.—Papers respecting military and Indian affairs in New Mexico.

4. Instructions to Colonel E. V. Sumner.

III.—Papers respecting military and Indian affairs in California.

8. Letter from Governor John McDougal.
9. Reply of the Secretary of War.
10. Instructions to General E. A. Hitchcock.

IV.—Papers respecting military and Indian affairs in Oregon.

11. Letter from Governor John P. Gaines.
12. Letter from the same.
13. Reply of the Acting Secretary of War.
17. Letter from Governor John P. Gaines.

V.—Papers respecting Indian affairs in Florida.

18. Letter from Governor Thomas Brown.
19. Reply of the Secretary of War.
20. Letter from the Secretary of the Interior.
21. Reply of the Secretary of War.
22. Order to Captain John C. Casey.

VII.—Report of the Quartermaster-General.
VIII.—Report of the Paymaster-General.
XI.—Report of the Colonel of Engineers.
XII.—Report of the Colonel of Topographical Engineers.